After World War II, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) emerged as a major patron of biomedical research. In the succeeding decades, NIH administrators sought to determine how best to disseminate the findings of the research it supported and manage their relationship with clinicians in the national community. This task of bridging research and practice fell to the Office of Medical Applications of Research (OMAR), which administered the NIH Consensus Development Program (CDP) between 1978 and 2012. This article argues that the CDP represented an unusual attempt to depoliticize biomedical research and medical practice at a particularly controversial time in American medicine. Throughout the program's existence, administrators sought ways to bring new knowledge to the medical community without creating the appearance of regulating clinical practice. For an agency with a mandate to promote the production of new biomedical knowledge, the question remained open as to how far this responsibility extended from the bench to the bedside. In striking this balance, the leadership sought to refine their understanding of the role and mission of the NIH. The history of the CDP has much to tell us about postwar biomedical research, health politics, and the institutional development of the NIH.
operated the Consensus Development Program (CDP), which held conferences on critical and often controversial topics, bringing together panels of experts to exchange opinions and create official "consensus statements."
This article examines this history of the CDP as a critical moment in late twentiethcentury medicine. I argue that the CDP represented an attempt by the federal government to depoliticize biomedical research and medical practice at a particularly controversial time in American medicine. NIH administrators hoped not only to depoliticize biomedicine but also to establish new models for consensus even as the politics of identity and waves of social activism polarized the nation. By attempting to insert the NIH into questions of medical practice, administrators were challenging the traditional role of the agency as a site and support for the production of biomedical knowledge. Could the government find a place near-but not quite at-the bedside?
While the NIH's postwar rise as a major patron of biomedical research has been well documented, historians have just begun to examine NIH administrators' efforts to interpret the NIH mission in relation to efforts to bridge scientific research and clinical practice.
11 This article uses the history of OMAR and the CDP to consider how NIH administrators sought to disseminate the abundant findings of the research it supported and manage their relationship with clinicians working in hospitals and clinics, often far from the laboratory. 12 During almost four decades, the CDP produced 159 consensus statements on topics as varied as acupuncture, gastric bypass surgery, total hip replacement, and the health benefits of pets (full listing available at (https://consensus.nih.gov/previous.htm) and in Appendix A) (Figure 1 ). Historians of medicine have examined specific CDP conferences related to debates about cholesterol management, breast cancer screening, hyperactivity disorders, and estrogen therapy. 13 However, none have examined the CDP itself as an object of historical analysis. Philosophers of science have written about the process of consensus in science more generally, exploring its limitations as a form of knowledge production and as an elusive goal.
14 Most notably, Miriam Solomon has examined the history of the CDP as part of a broader investigation of scientific knowledge production in the United States since the late 1970s. Solomon argues that NIH consensus conferences were activities designed to lend credibility to existing consensus among researchers rather than establish new consensus or resolve scientific controversy. 15 Leaving aside questions of the program's effectiveness, this article engages with the CDP as a means of better understanding the ongoing struggle of NIH officials to come to terms with the agency's mission as the major patron of biomedical research in the United States. Rather than addressing all 159 conferences, this article relies on several representative case studies to explore the selection of topics, mechanisms of achieving consensus, standards of evidence, and the NIH's relationship with the medical and lay communities. The exact nature of the NIH's mission was a focus of debate since the agency's founding. When the Ransdell Act formalized the National Institute of Health in 1930, it defined the NIH mission as encompassing the "study, investigation, and research in the fundamental problems of the diseases of man and matters pertaining thereto." 16 Congressional reviews of NIH activities during Shannon's tenure, including hearings by Congressman Lawrence Fountain (D-NC) during the late 1950s, similarly focused on the goal of producing new biomedical knowledge, without mention of its dissemination to the profession or the public. In 1963, the NIH Study Committee, appointed by President Kennedy's Office of Science and Technology and commonly referred to as the Wooldridge Committee, reviewed the efficiency and accountability of NIH administrative structures and practices. In its 1965 report, the Committee reiterated the broad mandate of the agency, concluding that the NIH mission entailed "the stimulation and support of a very broad range of health-related or biomedical research." 17 While it noted that the agency's aim was "improvement of virtually all aspects of the Nation's health," the Committee argued that this broader goal was attainable primarily with research in the basic sciences. 18 In their internal, unpublished response to the Wooldridge report, NIH administrators drew particular attention to the question of mission and the existing tension between basic and applied research. Commentary prepared by the NIH Director's office posited that the committee's report "conveys a sense that the NIH is perceived as a science agency interested in biological and medical problems, and not a health agency applying science and technology to the solution of health and health-related problems." 19 While the official stance emphasized the agency's research functions, many NIH administrators believed it was a "health agency," which ought to be more directly involved in the business of "the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disease." 20 This underlying tension reflected the essential debate that would characterize more than thirty years of the CDP. In theory, the CDP was designed to help NIH officials demonstrate the clinical relevance of the research they funded in Bethesda and at academic medical centers across the country. Examining its history illuminates how officials sought to define the agency's role at a time when calls for public accountability in science were becoming increasingly frequent. But how could the NIH respond to these calls without neglecting its mission as the nation's primary producer of biomedical knowledge? By gathering experts to discuss how new insights from biomedical research could be applied in the medical and public health arenas, NIH administrators assured that the agency was paying attention to the clinical utility of the research it funded.
NIH institutes employed the CDP for slightly different purposes at different times: as a response to perceived mission creep, as a defense against external criticism, and as an incubator for other NIH programming. The conferences highlighted in this article illustrate how NIH administrators hoped to use the program to engage in public discourse with physicians and other medical professionals (the CDP's original intended audience) and sometimes with the general public while recognizing that public dissatisfaction with medical experts was high.
21 Between 1977 and 2013 , the NIH grew from eleven institutes to twenty, some of which were the products of division or consolidation. Unsurprisingly, the NCI, the historically best-funded institute, was the most frequent sponsor or co-sponsor of CDP conferences. Other institutes, particularly NIA (Aging), NICHD (Child Health and Human Development), and NIDDK (Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases) were consistent conference sponsors, doing so during each decade of the CDP's existence. A review of CDP consensus statements suggests that all but one NIH institute sponsored or co-sponsored at least one CDP conference ( Figure 2 ). As OMAR director Barnett Kramer later reflected, "we were supposed to be a resource to the other institutes."
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OMAR carefully planned conferences to avoid the perception of undue influence by the sponsoring institute. This way, institutes "could legitimately say that they recognized a gap in knowledge. . .but they did not want to be accused of having forced the conclusion in one direction or another." 23 The mechanism of institute sponsorship was critical to maintaining the administrative balance of power among the Office of the Director, OMAR, and the institutes, demonstrating that CDP topics were selected by individual institutes, rather than by the central NIH governance. As Kramer explained, "Building 1 [where all central administration was located] wouldn't put forward ideas. And we [OMAR] were in Building 1, so they supported the process; they funded us. But they. . .didn't play an intimate role beyond that." 24 This paper focuses on three distinct periods in the CDP's history. These three periods, which I define as formation, codification, and retrenchment, were characterized by changing approaches to the project of consensus making. The CDP's first five years represented a transformative period of institutional formation (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) during which NIH administrators worked to define and publicize the CDP. A prolonged codification period (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) followed, during which NIH administrators held frequent consensus conferences aimed at influencing clinicians and policymakers, even while they continued to debate the agency's mission. Guided by a series of commissioned 21 external program reviews in the 1980s and 1990s, the CDP underwent frequent reforms. Limited by a reticence to intrude upon physician autonomy or provide prescriptive advice, the CDP found itself unable to enforce its recommendations or even evaluate the extent to which the medical community was aware of them. Nevertheless, this period was marked by several tangible successes such as insurance coverage of liver transplantation, the adoption of newborn auditory screening, and the implementation of clinical trials registries.
This long period of continuity gave way to a period of retrenchment (1996-2013) that included a yearlong pause in conference activity during which the CDP underwent a systematic reevaluation that determined that the program needed to change how evidence was collected and disseminated in advance of conferences. In response, new OMAR leadership ushered in a period during which far fewer conferences were held. This retrenchment period coincided with two notable developments that transformed science governance at the NIH: the broad institutionalization of translational medicine under the NIH directorships of Elias Zerhouni and Francis Collins, and a five-year doubling of the NIH budget soon followed by recession-related budgetary constraints. By 2013, the CDP was formally terminated, perceived by administrators as an increasingly irrelevant tool amid the dominance of multiple other organizations tasked with evaluating evidence and developing clinical practice guidelines.
CONSENSUS AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE
During the 1960s, discussions in Congress about linking research to practice emerged in considerations of technology assessment, a distinctive field of policy research that arose in the setting of concerns about the financial and social costs of new technologies. 25 The introduction of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, which represented a significant new federal and state financial commitment to health care, only added to these concerns. 26 More generally, Americans worried that the cost of health care was spiraling out of control, spurred by President Nixon's 1969 declaration of a "massive crisis" in health care.
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By the mid-1970s, the federal government had initiated several efforts to investigate and regulate the organization of research at the NIH. In 1975, Public Law 93-352 authorized the creation of the President's Biomedical Research Panel, a seven member body which would "review and assess the conduct, support, policies, and management of biomedical and behavioral research" at the NIH. 28 The panel's 1976 report concluded-just as President Kennedy's earlier Wooldridge Committee report hadthat there remained an essential tension "between the research mission of the NIH and the application and dissemination of knowledge." 29 In fact, the committee found that an average of seven years elapsed between a scientific discovery and its introduction into clinical practice.
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As the federal financial commitment to health care continued to grow, so too did Congressional inquiries. In June 1976, the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Subcommittee on Health convened to discuss one of the presumed culprits in rising health care costs: new clinical technologies such as coronary bypass surgery and kidney dialysis. Senators Jacob Javits (D-NY) and Edward Kennedy (D-MA) argued that the NIH had a responsibility to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of these new modalities. scientific community must assume greater responsibility for the effect of research on the quality and cost of health care." 32 Fredrickson had already sensed the need for the NIH to defend its mission and productivity more broadly. One year earlier, he had argued that a "translation gap" from research findings to clinical applications hindered the agency's efforts to provide directly useful knowledge to the American public.
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In response to these concerns, Fredrickson commissioned NIH hematologist Seymour Perry to produce a report on how the NIH might translate biomedical research into clinical practice. Released in February 1977 , the report emphasized the need for stronger collaboration between the NIH and other members of the medical community. It also recommended establishing "a consensus-building mechanism," which would "include representatives of major participants in health care delivery, financing, and regulation." 34 This new mechanism would provide a venue for evaluating ambiguous clinical evidence, particularly for new or unproven technologies. A new office formed within the Office of the Director would develop guidelines for identifying new clinically relevant research knowledge and disseminate that information to medical practitioners.
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Perry strove to establish clearly delineated boundaries for the proposed consensus "mechanism." As he acknowledged, professional societies and academic medical centers were already engaged in translating research into practice, albeit ineffectively in his estimation. The consensus "mechanism" would carry some advisory capacity, and greater collaboration among the federal government and medical professionals would represent a "final and essential step in the transfer of new information pertinent to health and disease, [which] is not being approached systematically."
36 Perry estimated start-up costs totaling only $669,000 for the first year, which included funding to hire five personnel for an office within the Office of the Director, embed ten personnel across five unspecified NIH institutes, develop an information dissemination program, and sponsor five consensus conferences at an approximate cost of $35,000 each.
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In response to Congressional inquiries, Frederickson requested in May 1977 Fredrickson and fellow NIH administrators determined that the CDP would assess the scientific and technical aspects of new clinical technologies, but not necessarily their economic, ethical, and social implications. As Fredrickson explained, "if we lay out the state-of-the-art-what it is we know and do not know from data scientifically derived-we will serve medicine and society through provision of a sounder base on which further value judgments can be laid."
41 But avoiding the social and ethical implications of these technologies would prove difficult and sometimes impossible.
INSTITUTIONAL FORMATION: 1977-1981
OMAR sponsored thirty-one conferences during the CDP's first five years, most between 1978 and 1980. These first five years were characterized by multiple attempts to define the CDP both institutionally and intellectually.
42 OMAR staff faced the burden of fitting the concept of consensus development into the existing structure of biomedical research while also distinguishing it as a new enterprise. This forced them to reckon with the essential role of the NIH. Was it to be a patron of knowledge production, an information clearinghouse, or some combination of the two? Administrators at other federal agencies, most notably the National Science Foundation (NSF), were also grappling with how to define their institutional missions. The contemporaneous rise of the NSF and NIH after World War II would have a lasting impact on postwar scientific research in the United States. As Toby Appel has demonstrated, NIH's rise as a major patron of biomedical research challenged NSF's identity as a sponsor of basic research, and in response, NSF administrators sought to distinguish its patronage efforts from those of the NIH by focusing primarily on the production of new knowledge, with minimal attention to its clinical application.
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As OMAR staff members established the CDP's intellectual and institutional foundations, they frequently described its mission as though repetition would solidify its purpose. Early CDP pamphlets framed the CDP as "aimed at improving the translation of the results of biomedical research. . .into knowledge that can effectively be employed in the practice of medicine and public health."
44 Yet, officials alternately described the CDP as a communication program, a peer review program, and a technology assessment program. One early OMAR administrator made the case for the second interpretation, arguing that the peer review system and the CDP differed only on a matter of scale. In one sense, he argued that the CDP was to be the peer review system for the entire biomedical community-effectively yet another venue for expert opinion. 45 Meanwhile, promotional materials described the CDP as a science communications tool. One information sheet explained that the CDP would "provide the physician and the public with current, responsible information on the pros and cons of medical technologies." 46 Panelists at one 1979 CDP conference, for example, discussed the benefits and risks of wisdom tooth extraction, while participants of a 1980 conference on febrile seizures discussed the role and potential risks of seizure prophylaxis. 47 In this sense, the CDP functioned as a kind of medical advisor of sorts.
The general contours of the CDP's approach to conference planning and administration also took shape during this first period. Typically, NIH institute directors approached OMAR and requested that it plan and administer conferences on topics of particular significance to their institute. These requests dictated CDP conference topics, evident by the consistent variety of topics addressed in any given year. planning committee of OMAR staff and other NIH institute representatives then selected panelists and speakers and prepared the conference schedule.
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Conferences typically lasted two or three days and consisted of a combination of open public sessions and closed executive sessions held on the NIH campus in Bethesda, Maryland. During the public sessions, speakers presented data and commentary to the conference panelists and audience members. Upon conclusion of the public sessions, panelists participated in an overnight executive session during which they crafted a preliminary CDP statement. On the final day of the conference, panelists distributed the statement to audience members and received feedback during one final round of public discussion. After this final plenary session, panelists and OMAR staff edited and finalized the statement, which then stood as the final record of the conference.
As OMAR staff codified CDP practices during the mid-1980s, CDP statements developed a consistent formula that required responses to between four and six questions. Panelists typically assessed the current state of knowledge regarding the chosen conference topic and in some cases offered practice or policy recommendations. After 1982, all CDP statements concluded with panelists' identification of priorities for future research. This longstanding practice represented the CDP as an endeavor operating at the intersection of basic and applied science. CDP research recommendations typically ranged from calls for further investigation into the natural history and mechanisms of particular diseases to outcomes evaluations of discrete diagnostic and therapeutic interventions.
Perhaps the most important part of a consensus conference happened after it ended. OMAR had amassed a broad network of contacts to which it sent CDP statements, including national TV networks, local news outlets, and an array of medical and scientific journals. Administrators touted this network when they referred to the CDP as a communications tool. Indeed, a 1989 RAND review of the CDP framed it as "more than an assessment program. It is also a communication program to the professional community and the public." 50 CDP conferences brought scientists, clinicians, and health advocates to the NIH campus and allowed them to utilize OMAR's public communication and media distribution expertise to spread their message. OMAR administrators hoped that their unique form of communication would facilitate behavioral changes among health care professionals. As OMAR director John Ferguson noted when he was appointed to the position in 1988, patient care obligations often limited his opportunities to learn about new medical technologies. The CDP, he explained, "brings the best, most current science directly to the clinician. It summarizes the information and critiques it in as non-biased a manner as possible." 51 By the mid-1980s, the OMAR mailing list totaled over 21,000 recipients. 52 Ideally, this would make the most state of the art medical information easily accessible to practicing clinicians.
Whether NIH administrators defined the CDP's mission in terms of peer review or science communication, they wanted it to provide an interactive venue for bridging research and practice. A CDP conference would bring together multiple stakeholders to evaluate publicly an ambiguous, incomplete, or emerging evidence base on a particular medical technology. As an informational brochure explained, the CDP would "[improve] the translation of the results of biomedical research pertinent to health care into knowledge that can effectively be employed in the practice of medicine and public health." 53 The language of this brochure suggests that even from the beginning, NIH officials believed that medical knowledge was too vast to be interpreted by individual practicing doctors and needed "translating" for public consumption.
The first CDP conference predated the formal organization of OMAR. Held over a three-day period as an open forum on the NIH campus, this September 1977 conference on breast cancer screening posed a series of questions to a panel composed of medical and public health professionals, professors of law and theology, and other members of the public. Only three of the sixteen panelists were women, including New York Medical College oncologist Jane Wright, who was later celebrated for her achievements as a pioneering African American female physician, and Yale Divinity School ethicist Margaret Farley. The conference panel was charged with evaluating evidence related to breast cancer screening, particularly data from the Breast Cancer Detection Demonstration Project.
The National Cancer Institute (NCI) and the American Cancer Society had jointly organized the Demonstration Project in 1974 to determine the role of different screening modalities in the early detection of breast cancer. In an era when feminists were attacking medical experts for their paternalistic attitudes and demanding more bodily autonomy, the Demonstration Project-and more broadly the issue of breast cancer screening-represented an opportunity for women to speak up and demand that they be more involved in their health care decisions. 54 By 1976, science journalists began to raise questions about the possible risks of the radiation from mammograms administered during the Demonstration Project. They were not alone. As the use of radiation for diagnostic and therapeutic procedures increased during the 1950s and 1960s, so too did public concerns about patient safety and the hazards associated with radiation exposure. 55 Critics suggested that radiation exposure itself could cause future breast cancer in previously asymptomatic women, and the popular press quickly picked up on these findings. San Francisco Chronicle journalist Judith Randal called the Demonstration Project "a vicious circle of mistakes" while the New York Times dismissed the program as "ill-conceived" and "dangerous." 56 In January 1977, the NCI had convened a review panel to determine the utility of routine breast cancer screening for asymptomatic women. The panel occurred at a time when breast cancer activists were publicly challenging the medical status quo regarding radical mastectomy, but before much was known about the science and implementation of population-based breast cancer screening. 57 It found no justification for routine mammographic screening for women under the age of fifty, recommending it only for women in their forties with a family history of breast cancer and for women between thirty-five and thirty-nine with a personal history of breast cancer. 58 The September 1977 CDP conference took place not long after the review panel released its report. In his opening remarks, NIH Director Donald Fredrickson expressed hope that the conference would hasten the "conversion of information to knowledge, and knowledge to wisdom." 59 After two days of presentations, the CDP panel produced a statement that its members "deplored the lack of clear-cut data on the efficacy and the risk-benefit ratio of screening for women under 50 years of age," and argued for new randomized clinical trials. 60 The CDP panel endorsed the recommendations of the earlier Demonstration Project review panel, effectively upholding the findings of an NIHfunded controversial program that faced serious criticisms from the general public.
The CDP panel did, however, recommend that Demonstration Project administrators develop clearer, more transparent informed consent documents and background materials for women and their physicians. 61 Although these suggestions were not technical in nature, conference participants stressed their importance for encouraging better communication between physicians and patients. In his closing remarks, Fredrickson praised consensus development as "a method for speeding up the transfer and validation of a body of medical knowledge which can be applied for the common good. Thier, the chair of internal medicine at Yale University School of Medicine and chair of the conference, published an editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine that accompanied the CDP statement. As he explained, the "breast-cancer screening controversy illustrates the risk of transferring technology too rapidly even when the transfer is made with the best of intentions." 63 He was suggesting there simply was not sufficient data to make a clear recommendation about mammography. Had the consensus conference been premature?
The gap between the promise of a new technology and its most effective clinical use was made clear during another early CDP conference on cervical cancer screening in 1980. Many physicians made it a routine practice in the 1970s to recommend yearly Pap smears, while critics like the feminist news journal Off Our Backs commented that the practice "[provides] doctors with a steady, reliable basic income" and "explains why obstetrician-gynecologists are the wealthiest of all the medical specialists." 64 In addition, by the late 1970s, the practice had come into question through the accumulating evidence that it took over a decade for a precancerous in-situ cervical lesion to develop into invasive cancer. 65 Reflecting on these findings, as well as the fact that that most of the data on Pap effectiveness was based on far more infrequent screening, the American Cancer Society (ACS) amended its recommendations that year to allow for screenings every three years in women who had had two negative Pap smears one year apart. 66 The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) maintained the importance of yearly Pap smears as a means of closely following women at higher risk for cervical cancer as well as providing better primary health care to all women. 67 Despite these debates, the benefit of cervical cancer screening remained unclear. Although screening advocates had maintained that Pap smears reduced mortality rates for cervical cancer, subsequent analyses suggested that screening had a smaller than expected impact. 68 Two epidemiologists went so far as to proclaim the Pap smear a "dubious policy success" because policymakers endorsed and health professionals performed the procedure before clear evidence of its efficacy was available. 69 In 1980, OMAR convened a CDP conference to review the existing evidence on screening intervals and cervical cancer mortality rates. After working until four in the morning to come to a consensus, the panel endorsed the Pap smear as a routine screening procedure, but recommended against screening for women who had never been sexually active and for those over the age of sixty who had two previous negative Pap smear results. Appeasing both the ACS and ACOG, the panel also concluded that healthy, low-risk women should be rescreened every one to three years, with the precise interval at the discretion of a woman and her physician. 70 In response, the feminist National Women's Health Network released a statement recommending screening every three years after three consecutive negative annual Pap smears, focusing on the issue of access to screening for disadvantaged women. 71 Although it failed to please everyone, the split panel had issued a clear set of clinical guidelines, going far beyond mere evaluation of technology transfer or scientific advising. And yet the resulting CDP statement also strove to preserve patient autonomy by answering to women who sought control over their bodies with its flexible statement about screening intervals.
From its inception, the CDP fielded criticism from detractors who warned that consensus development would lead to potential government intrusion upon medical decision-making. In 1980 the director of the American College of Surgeons deemed the CDP an attention-getting maneuver by the NIH, concluding, "I find it difficult to see how this entire 'consensus' meddling can advance the best interests of the individual patient."
72 Concerns such as this reflected decades-long physician fears of government control, which had been particularly apparent during recurrent debates about creating a national health system. 73 These criticisms were also the result of the CDP's nebulous character in the 1970s: an evaluative program that appeared to engage in quasi-regulatory activities. In fact, NIH administrators envisioned the CDP taking on an advisory role, not a regulatory one. Seymour Perry argued in an internal document distributed to institute directors that the NIH catalyzed the consensus-making enterprise. 74 Perry's language was purposeful; a catalyst is a substance that speeds up a chemical reaction without itself being altered. Thus, he maintained that the NIH was solely serving as a dispassionate third party advisor, putting the right people in the same room to evaluate and disseminate biomedical knowledge. Yet some critics argued that this very practice lacked a certain degree of analytical precision despite its NIH imprimatur. One commentator in the New England Journal of Medicine worried that CDP statements would prompt undue fear or halt innovation. As he remarked, "I fear lest these statements will act like a dead hand, discouraging thought. After all, in the nature of things, they can only rehash, codify, and grade work already done." 75 Indeed, consensus development relied heavily upon the role of expert opinion, as CDP panelists and presenters deliberated over the veracity and utility of extant knowledge. Yet in the eyes of NIH administrators, CDP conferences could help defend the agency against external criticism or promote internal programming, both of which had been a goal of the first conference on breast cancer screening.
Some conferences were held in response to public health concerns. Starting in February 1980, newspapers began reporting higher rates of Reye syndrome, a life threatening condition associated with swelling in the brain and fatty deposits in the liver that seemed to occur in children recovering from chickenpox or influenza. 76 In July, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported on a possible link between aspirin and Reye syndrome based on a small case control study of seven children with the condition in Arizona. 77 In November, the CDC reported on similar studies from Ohio and Michigan, also suggesting an association between aspirin and Reye. Although the studies were small and imperfect, relying on subjects to remember accurately whether or not they had taken aspirin, the CDC concluded that aspirin "may be a factor in the pathogenesis of Reye syndrome" and urged parents to "use caution" when giving it to their ill children.
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When the CDP conference on Reye syndrome was convened in March 1981, anxieties were high. 79 Tellingly, OMAR staff narrowed the conference focus to include only the diagnosis and treatment of Reye syndrome, not the emerging controversy surrounding its association with aspirin. This kept with the NIH's stated preference for technical consensus but also enabled NIH officials to avoid wading into the growing public debate. Ultimately, the CDP statement made only brief reference to the aspirin association. Noting that "salicylates [such as aspirin] alone cannot be responsible for the development of Reye's syndrome," the statement stressed the "need for further carefully designed studies before recommending changes in antipyretic therapy of children." 80 The statement was ahead of its time. A year later, the CDC, Surgeon General, and American Academy of Pediatrics all issued definitive statements declaring an association between aspirin use and Reye syndrome. In 1986, the FDA ruled that all aspirin bottles were required to carry a warning about the Reye syndrome link. 81 In a sense, the Reye conference had preserved institutional autonomy for the NIH. The agency had responded to public pressure by hosting the Reye conference, but the decision to sidestep controversy ensured that other health agencies-in this case, the CDC and FDA-would be more actively engaged in media coverage of the protracted controversy while the NIH maintained its focus on clinical research.
CODIFICATION: 1982-1995
In 1982, OMAR administrators found themselves pushed to refine the CDP's identity in light of the newly created National Center for Health Care Technology, a new subunit within the US Department of Health and Human Services that was completely independent of NIH. 82 Although the National Center was short-lived (it existed only from 1979 to 1982), it served as a counterpoint to NIH's approach to technology assessment. The Health Services Research, Health Statistics, and Health Care Technology Act of 1978 gave the National Center a congressional mandate to assess the safety and efficacy of health care technologies, instructing the Center to develop and distribute norms and standards for the use of health care technologies. The Act also gave the Center a quasi-regulatory role, advising the Health Care Financing Administration on Medicare reimbursement policies.
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In contrast, the CDP generally limited its focus to the safety and efficacy of new or unproven technologies. This narrow scope reflected the NIH preference to focus on the technical rather than the social or economic aspects of new treatments and technologies. 84 The prioritization of "technical consensus" and subtle avoidance of the social or cultural aspects of medical advances ensured that the NIH's interpretation of technology assessment remained closely tied to its primary mission as a biomedical research agency. When the Reagan administration imposed major budget cuts in 1982, the National Center was dissolved, while OMAR escaped unscathed, in part because it did not identify as a policymaking body like the National Center, an easy target for the anti-regulatory administration. 85 Both former and acting OMAR officials continued to grapple with how the CDP's activities pertained to the NIH mission. Former OMAR director Charles Lowe and his assistant Susan Asch noted in 1984 that "In simplest terms, OMAR is intended to be the 'facilitator' that will permit basic and, in particular, clinical research to be transferred more rapidly into health care practice. not attempt to encourage practitioners to adopt consensus conference findings in the clinic, as this would exceed the NIH's domain of expertise and authority. 87 The issue of what kinds of questions OMAR ought to address also provoked some handwringing. In particular, administrators wondered whether CDP conferences ought to address social, ethical, legal, or economic questions, worrying that such topics were beyond their mandate.
88 Ultimately, they agreed to focus only on new biomedical knowledge, theoretically stripped of its sociocultural factors. Although the CDP was unable to resolve questions of authority and mission completely, it hosted eight-seven conferences between 1982 and 1995, averaging at least six conferences per year. This codification period represented the most active time for the CDP in terms of conference frequency, program evaluation, and public engagement.
Despite these mission-related challenges, several CDP conferences during this period spurred meaningful changes in health policy. 89 In 1983, OMAR co-sponsored a conference on liver transplantation in order to evaluate which patients would be optimal candidates to receive an organ and to identify the long-range risks and benefits of transplantation. With the introduction of the immunosuppressant drug cyclosporine in 1980, liver transplants had become more feasible and far more common. But cyclosporine cost $6000 per year and was not covered by Medicare, and liver transplants were expensive interventions in their own right. 90 The decision to hold a consensus conference on liver transplantation was, according to OMAR's deputy director John Kalberer, "a political request" derived from public pressure. As OMAR associate director Richard Crout recalled, "The topic was picked basically by HCFA [Health Care Finance Administration] facing the decision on whether to reimburse" insurance companies for the costs of the operation and the care associated with it.
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In the CDP statement, the panel concluded that although more research was necessary, "liver transplantation offers an alternative therapeutic approach which may prolong life in some patients suffering from severe liver disease that has progressed beyond the reach of currently available treatment." 92 The CDP conference played a critical role in the acceptance and coverage of transplantation as a standard therapeutic option. For example, a 1984 Illinois statute stated that transplantation of any organ would only be covered by insurance if OMAR deemed it to be a non-experimental procedure. 93 served as a guiding document for the policymaking process-even as NIH officials argued that the CDP statements were not supposed to have any regulatory capacity. A 1988 CDP conference on the cochlear implant was met with mixed public response. Although cochlear implants had been developed in the 1960s and implanted in several thousand individuals by the time of the conference, questions about the success and safety of the devices remained unresolved. At the time of the CDP conference, the FDA classified cochlear implants for children as investigational devices because of a lack of data on how implants influenced long-term auditory development. The conference thus focused on identifying suitable candidates for implantation, assessing benefits and risks for different types of cochlear implants, and evaluating special considerations for implantation in children. The resulting CDP statement, which deemed cochlear implants "an important step in our long-range goal of understanding, preventing, and treating hearing impairment and resulting language disorders," was favorable but noncommittal. 94 It reflected support for the assistive devices while calling for additional research on auditory pathways, comparative analyses of different device models, and new assessment and education programs.
Members of the deaf community were more circumspect. Many deaf adults and parents of deaf children argued that the cochlear impact represented a tacit rejection of Deaf identity and culture. 95 Yet the CDP statement's favorable assessment of cochlear implants gained traction in the medical community across the Atlantic. In the United Kingdom, the CDP statement played a critical role in the funding of these devices by the British National Health Service, a rare but important example of CDP activities influencing global health practices. 96 The CDP similarly played a role in the adoption of newborn auditory screening. A 1993 conference held on the topic recommended universal auditory screening of all newborns, after which state officials from Rhode Island and California cited the CDP statement when establishing their own state-based universal screening programs. 97 Around the same time, several CDP conferences and workshops addressed the dissemination of clinical trial data. In the early 1990s, researchers, policymakers, and health advocates debated the merits of democratizing access to clinical trial data. 98 A 1991 CDP workshop discussed how and when early, practice-changing results of NIH-funded clinical trials should be communicated to the public, a process workshop participants felt was clinically and morally important. 99 A second workshop in 1993 considered the issue of clinical trial registries. While two individual NIH institutes had their own online databases with information about ongoing trials, there existed no comparable, comprehensive database for all government-funded clinical trials. 100 The workshop statement concluded that clinical trial registries were an integral component of an "evidence based health system" and emphasized the need to capture both published and unpublished data so that medical professionals would have access to all relevant data in making clinical decisions. 101 By 1997 The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act required the NIH to create a public registry of clinical trials and in 2000, the NIH developed ClinicalTrials.gov, which remains the most comprehensive clearinghouse for clinical trials data.
Nevertheless, NIH administrators struggled throughout the 1980s and 1990s to convince a hesitant medical community that the CDP would not intrude upon the professional autonomy of clinical practitioners. As one physician warned in a JAMA editorial, "we must protect the individual choices of each physician from the potential tyrannical domination of consensus and allow the process of development of new knowledge to continue." 102 To assuage these concerns, administrators continually stressed the CDP's advisory nature. 103 It was almost as though OMAR doth protest too much -as though continuing to declare the office's role would obscure the uncertainty that remained about its real function. But CDP statements on topics like Pap smears, which had included prescriptive recommendations that resembled clinical guidelines in language and style, gave the appearance that the CDP engaged in the very practices that NIH officials were trying to avoid. 104 From the beginning, NIH administrators had maintained that the CDP was designed to facilitate changes in physician behavior. However, without the authority to implement or enforce its recommendations, the program had great difficulty instituting change. Moreover, it proved difficult to demonstrate whether the CDP had accomplished such change, or even whether physicians were aware of CDP statements despite OMAR's robust distribution network.
105 NIH administrators attributed these challenges to what they deemed the "two-cultures" problem. CDP conference organizers were typically members of the academic community and representatives of the federal government, but practicing physicians and other clinicians were the intended audience. 106 Perhaps the communities were failing to communicate. But in attempting to avoid the perception of intruding upon the professional autonomy of medical professionals, NIH officials had left the CDP devoid of any teeth to implement its recommendations.
Despite lacking any enforcement or legal regulatory power, the CDP was nagged throughout the 1980s and 1990s by accusations that it had engaged in favoritism by prioritizing particular views over others. In one such case, one 1984 CDP panel had recommended that all Americans over the age of two reduce their consumption of cholesterol and saturated fats in order to prevent coronary artery disease based on evidence from a clinical trial of a cholesterol-lowering drug. Critics questioned the strength of evidence employed by the CDP panel, arguing that data was not yet strong enough to warrant changing dietary recommendations for an entire population. 107 A 1990 conference on the use of recombinant bovine somatotropin (rBST) on dairy farms to increase milk production concluded that the hormone had no measurable effect on the milk produced by treated cows. 108 Although OMAR officials hoped the conference would resolve an ongoing public controversy, the panelists-including a dairy farmer-had not had access to unpublished data from rBST manufacturers. Critics concluded that the NIH was merely in the pocket of the dairy industry. As one physician opponent sniped, "Essentially, the panel has examined sanitized data of industry scientists and their indentured academics." matters of ethics and tone. 111 In response, OMAR officials strengthened conflict of interest guidelines by barring panelists from having a financial interest in a conference topic and by requiring planning committee members to disclose both intellectual and financial conflicts of interest. 112 The result, they hoped, would be panels comprised of more neutral participants who could sift through the available evidence more impartially. As Miriam Solomon has argued, these procedural changes bolstered the "appearance of trustability" associated with consensus conference proceedings. 113 RETRENCHMENT (1996-2013): THE COLLAPSE OF CONSENSUS By the late 1990s, CDP activities entered a downturn. OMAR had sponsored an average of at least six conferences a year during the preceding two decades, a number which was cut in half between 1996 and 1999. Yet consensus conferences continued to address complex issues and skirt the boundary between knowledge dissemination and guideline creation. Conferences on total knee replacement (2003) and hepatitis B (2008) drew explicit attention to perceived shortcomings in evidence-based practices, while the hepatitis B conference and another on acupuncture (1997) also engaged with broader programming priorities for NIH institutes.
A 1997 conference on breast cancer screening emerged as perhaps the most controversial consensus conference. In January 1997, the CDP convened yet another conference on breast cancer screening. 114 Four years earlier, the NCI had stopped recommending mammograms for women in their forties based on the findings of its International Workshop on Screening for Breast Cancer, a decision which sparked public controversy and Congressional inquiry. 115 In response, NCI Director Richard Klausner requested that a CDP conference address the controversy and evaluate new data. The conference became notable for the firestorm that ensued upon its adjournment. The CDP statement endorsed the NCI's decision, stating that available scientific data did not support a recommendation for universal mammography screening for women in their forties. 116 As Constance Rufenbarger, a consumer advocate, breast cancer survivor, and CDP panelist, best summed up: "There's no one up here who would not like to say that if you go for that mammogram, we can find early cancer and you would be cured. But if you cannot say that, can you recommend to every woman in her 40's that she have a mammogram?" 117 Many felt this was an oversimplification of the matter, however.
The CDP statement angered screening proponents, many of whom argued that the panelists misinterpreted data, overemphasized the risks of screening, and underplayed its benefits. 118 One New Mexico mammographer and conference speaker called the statement "tantamount to a death sentence for thousands of women." 119 Other journalists noted that "other than the muffin crumbs from its meetings, the only thing this panel left behind is more confusion," and that "the wimpy panel could not bring itself to recommend the most effective diagnostic test we have." 120 Senator Arlen Specter, then chairman of the Labor, HHS, and Education appropriations committee, called for a Congressional hearing. Senator Olympia Snowe, along with a bipartisan group of fifty-one co-sponsors, ultimately introduced a nonbinding "sense of the Senate" resolution that urged the NCI to consider recommending mammography screening for women in their forties or to "direct the public to consider guidelines issued by other organizations." 121 The resolution passed by a 98-0 vote. As unique as the firestorm might have been, the conference had done what it was meant to do: evaluate ambiguous scientific information related to medical practice. 122 Although this conference highlighted the NIH's often difficult position within a broader debate about clinical guidelines, prevention, and women's health, it is important to recognize that CDP conferences that ended so divisively were not the norm. While conceived in response to criticism of cancer screening practices, the CDP statement opened the door for public criticism of the NIH, particularly when the statement was at odds with guidelines issued by other professional organizations. Although NIH administrators made it abundantly clear that OMAR was not in the business of producing clinical guidelines and had adopted neutralizing practices like choosing panel members without conflicts of interest, some CDP activities and statements gave the appearance that the NIH was participating in the very activities its leaders insisted fell outside their purview.
A 1997 conference on acupuncture marked the CDP's entry into yet another longstanding debate within clinical research and medicine: how to evaluate practices deemed as alternative or outside the dominant biomedical paradigm. The 1991 creation of the NIH's Office of Alternative Medicine had proven contentious as critics were dismayed by the prospect of federal funds being spent to evaluate alternative medicine while the nation was experiencing a recession. 123 Six NIH institutes served as conference co-sponsors, suggesting relatively wide support for NIH evaluation of alternative medical practices.
CDP panelists were charged with reviewing data on the efficacy and clinical applications of acupuncture as well as identifying barriers to its broader adoption. As the panel maintained, research on acupuncture's efficacy consisted primarily of case studies rather than controlled trials. Even so, the panel acknowledged that " [t] here is sufficient evidence of acupuncture's value to expand its use into conventional medicine and to encourage further studies of its physiology and clinical value."
124 Soon after the statement's publication, critics expressed frustration. Stanford oncologist Wallace Sampson, founder of the Scientific Review of Alternative Medicine, argued that conference panelists "engaged in pseudoscientific reasoning" and produced a report that suffered from a "lack of critical, scientific thinking." 125 In Science, Yale anesthesiologist Arthur Taub derided the conference as a meaningless farce. "In short," he concluded, "it appears that the panel concluded that acupuncture was virtually useless, declared a 'victory' as ordered up, and called for more research expenditure to heap on that already wasted." 126 With charges that the CDP was serving a political, rather than a scientific function, NIH Director Harold Varmus decided it was time to reevaluate the program.
In October 1998, Varmus established a working group to evaluate CDP practices and procedures, consisting of five NIH administrators and four outside professionals. 127 The working group concluded that the CDP still had an important role to play "in informing health care professionals and the pubic [sic] about improvements in medical practice and public health, and in clarifying inconsistencies between practice and supporting evidence." 128 Several changes were recommended, including a "more formalized and rigorous" process for selecting conference topics, preliminary meetings to discuss the evidence in advance of the actual conference, and the commissioning of evidence reviews to be distributed to panelists ahead of time. 129 This reassessment coincided with a complete halt in activity for the CDP. That year, OMAR sponsored no CDP conferences and John Ferguson retired after eleven years as OMAR director. 130 With a new decade came realignment for the CDP. In 2000, NCI deputy director Barnett Kramer was appointed as Ferguson's successor. Kramer had served as an institute representative for the 1997 breast cancer conference and was also a member of the 1999 Working Group. 131 Kramer's tenure as OMAR director formalized two initiatives begun under Ferguson's directorship: the institution of a "firewall" between sponsoring NIH institutes and OMAR, and the implementation of systematic evidence reviews preceding all conferences. As Kramer explained, "we wanted to make sure that the firewall was thick and strong so we developed a formal process that would take us to the point that the institute would recede into the background and leave the actual process of the conference to us." 132 A "firewall" could thus deflect claims of institutes' undue influence on consensus statements, which marred some consensus conferences during the 1980s.
In 2001, OMAR established a partnership with the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), another agency within the US Department of Health and Human Services, in order to produce and deliver systematic evidence reviews to conference panelists about one month before each CDP conference, as recommended by the Working Group. 133 This new arrangement extended the CDP's long-standing practice of sending conference panelists a packet that included conference abstracts and other background materials. 134 It also signified the CDP's incorporation of evidence-based methodologies as a means of further bolstering its claim to relevance. This move reflected OMAR administrators' awareness of the growing influence of evidence-based medicine, albeit at least a decade after which the concept gained popularity. 135 And yet, by providing more rigorous background information to participants in the form of systematic reviews, OMAR administrators were demonstrating their embrace of evidencebased medicine while, as Miriam Solomon has argued, potentially obviating the need to hold conferences at all. 136 The decreased annual frequency of conferences continued for the remainder of the CDP's tenure. In fact, during eight of the CDP's final fourteen years, the CDP sponsored only one or two conferences per year. A 2003 conference on total knee replacement highlighted how different groups of clinical practitioners perceived the strength of evidence (or lack thereof) supporting longstanding clinical practices, thus positioning OMAR uncomfortably between competing professional interests. The conference panel, which acknowledged the safety and cost-effectiveness of total knee replacement, nevertheless questioned the clinical benefits derived from the procedure. As Kramer explained, "there was a sense from some surgeons that they saw benefits with their own eyes and they were uncomfortable questioning whether replacing a knee was of benefit or not." 137 Moreover, when the panelists also concluded that no data supported specific rehabilitative practices, "the physical therapists were very upset that there was a statement to the effect that we don't know the nature of benefit-if it exists with physical therapy after the procedure." 138 No conference was free of politics, although OMAR remained uneasy with this fact.
Although CDP conferences became less frequent affairs during this time, NIH institutes continued to use them to advance different programmatic goals. The 1997 acupuncture conference illustrated how multiple NIH institutes indicated general interest in evaluating alternative medical practices. And although a 2008 hepatitis B (HBV) conference was "an eye opener for some of the hepatologists" when it illustrated a disconnect between commonly used clinical endpoints and actual health outcomes, 139 it also represented a promising example of programming coordination, conveniently falling just after the announcement of a new collaborative research initiative sponsored by the National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK). 140 With the appointment of radiologist and biomedical engineer Elias Zerhouni as NIH director in 2002 came a new focus on improving the quality of translational research. In 2003, Zerhouni launched the NIH-wide Roadmap for Medical Research, which formalized the agency's commitment to convert research findings into new clinical applications. 141 These presumably forward-thinking priorities actually mirrored those expressed in OMAR promotional materials from the early 1980s.
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Three decades later, NIH administrators were still debating the agency's role within the broader clinical research enterprise. 143 In 2009, OMAR's budget of $4.713 million represented a two-fold inflation-adjusted increase since 1977, far less than the three-fold increase in overall NIH appropriations over that same span. 144 With the onset of the recession, 2009 also marked a new period of budgetary constraints for the NIH. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of February 2009 provided only $10 billion to the NIH over a twoyear period, and administrators across the NIH tightened their purse strings. 145 Meanwhile, the push for translational medicine at the NIH only intensified with the appointment of geneticist Francis Collins as NIH director. In 2010, the NIH filed a trademark application with the US Patent and Trademark Office for a new motto, "NIH. . .Turning Discovery Into Health," granted in 2012, which captured the agency's intention to emphasize and publicize its translational obligations. 146 In 2012, Collins established the National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS) in order to build new partnerships with the private sector and more quickly develop clinical applications of basic research. As he remarked, "in recent years, researchers have succeeded in identifying the causes of nearly 4,500 diseases, but we have been unable to turn this knowledge into many new therapies: effective treatments exist for only about 250 of these diseases." 147 In its first fiscal year, NCATS received $574.7 million in funding. 148 This push for improved translational science ignored the CDP, which had been engaged in translating biomedical discoveries for over three decades. In comparison, the 2011 budget request prepared by the Office of the Director set OMAR's estimated budget at a paltry $4.935 million. 149 In January 2012, all OMAR staff and resources were transferred to the Office of Disease Prevention (ODP), another subunit of the Office of the Director. The announcement was buried five pages into an issue of the NIH Record, the NIH's biweekly employee newsletter, and published almost six weeks after the fact. NIH director Francis Collins explained that the reorganization would confer "considerable operational efficiencies" and that CDP conferences would be held even less frequently. 150 In other words, NIH administrators perceived the CDP as an expendable program but still saw it as a valuable tool in high-profile cases. In 2013, the CDP was officially disbanded. In a perfunctory statement, the ODP acknowledged that other organizations-the Cochrane Collaboration, the Community Preventive Services Task Force, the Institute of Medicine, and the United States Preventive Services Task Force, among othershad assumed authoritative roles in conducting literature reviews, building consensus, and making guidelines, rendering the CDP redundant.
151 Although Kramer had returned to the NCI by that time, he perceived that OMAR's closure was the result of the agency's sensibility that "we didn't want to do something another agency was doing now," particularly during a period of budget constraints.
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BRIDGING THE TRANSLATION GAP Over the course of several decades, politicians and NIH officials grappled with whether to define the NIH as a science agency focused on medical problems or a health agency that applied science to solve health-related problems. Charged with bridging the gap between research and practice, OMAR and the CDP-always small, circumscribed entities within the NIH bureaucracy-represented proxies for this broader debate about the NIH mission. Established in response to external calls for increased accountability of government funding, OMAR and the CDP allowed NIH administrators to test the waters with respect to publicizing and disseminating the clinical applications of basic research. Administrators presented the CDP as an information clearinghouse on new medical technologies while also affirming its neutrality and separation from regulatory and policymaking mechanisms. But they also used the CDP to respond to the political pressure they felt to defend and support agency-funded research while protecting the autonomy of their own member institutes. In essence, they hoped the CDP might serve as a buffer, protecting the NIH from larger cultural criticisms about the value and expense of research and new technologies.
By continually emphasizing information dissemination as a key driver of change, the CDP seemed to be operating under to a quixotic mandate, to change medical practice while eschewing regulation. For NIH administrators, the CDP was an opportunity to manage the pace of technological change by providing a new venue through which both established and emerging technologies could be evaluated. In some cases, the findings of the CDP directly led to changes in clinical practice and insurance coverage of new technologies and procedures, such as the 1983 liver transplant conference. In other cases, the findings of the CDP sparked stronger discord, such as the 1997 conference on mammography. And in many instances, the CDP had little or no influence at all.
If the work of the CDP was less about resolving scientific controversy, it was more about determining how the NIH could advance the clinical applications of the basic research it funded in Bethesda and across the country. In one sense, OMAR represented a boundary organization, operating at the intersection of research and clinical practice. 153 Not unlike technology transfer efforts in which incentives (such as licensing and patent protection) to commercialize scientific innovation are paramount, OMAR and the CDP provided opportunities for NIH administrators and researchers to demonstrate a certain degree of public accountability for NIH-supported research.
Almost forty years after the founding of the CDP, bridging the "gap" between research and practice remained an important goal for NIH administrators and researchers. For example, NIH's congressional justification for the 2013 fiscal year proclaimed that while fifty-four percent of the overall NIH budget had been devoted to basic research, the rest of the budget supported applied research. 154 The fact that the NIH supported basic and applied research in relatively equal measure demonstrates how NIH administrators had yet to resolve fully a question posed fifty years prior: was the NIH a science agency devoted to addressing medical concerns, or was it a health agency that applied science and technology in the name of improving health?
Ultimately, other initiatives superseded OMAR and the CDP during the NIH-wide turn toward translational medicine. As the NIH devoted more resources toward new initiatives such as the NCATS in an era of constrained budgets, OMAR remained relatively small. There is some irony in how NIH efforts to leverage evidence in pursuit of better health care fueled debate by providing a new arena in which professional conflicts could play out. Ultimately, the CDP failed to resolve essential tensions between science and medicine, research and practice, and information dissemination and medical regulation. But for over thirty-five years, it provided a critical space for debating not just important issues in health and biomedical research, but the mission and identity of the NIH as the nation's primary medical research agency. 
